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ANALYSIS 
Why the Veto Hurts More Than You Think 
BY SUSAN GROVER 
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is dead. Its slayers-chief among them President George Bush--claim to 
have made the business world safe from 
dreaded employment quotas. 
In fact, they have given some employ-
ers an even bigger prize: a good chance of 
avoiding altogether litigation to correct 
systemic workplace discrimination. 
For minority employees challenging 
workplace practices under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, consent decrees 
have been the primary vehicle for in-
stitutional reform. Such court-approved 
settlements, which generally establish af-
frrmative-action plans , have promised the 
cheapest and speediest resolution to many 
discrimination suits. 
Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, a 
1989 Supreme Court decision , changed 
that. In that case, the Court exposed con-
sent decrees to interminable "reverse 
discrimination" attacks by white employ-
ees who complain of the affrrmative action 
called for by such decrees. The vetoed 
civil-rights bill included a provision to 
reverse that decision, restoring the status 
of a fairly drawn consent decree as gener-
ally binding on all affected employees. 
With President Bush' s veto of the bill 
(which the Senate sustained on Oct. 24), 
consent decrees to settle discrimination 
suits are at risk of becoming useless . And 
if consent decrees are at risk, so is em-
ployment discrimination litigation itself. 
The reasons for this assessment are 
complicated, but bear out such pessimism. 
Before Wilks, most federal appellate 
courts recognized an "impermissible col-
lateral attack doctrine ," which effectively 
required white employees who wished to 
challenge a consent decree in a discrimina-
tion case to intervene in the suit in ques-
tion. The doctrine encouraged parties to 
settle their disputes and avoided duplica-
tive litigation. 
In Wilks, the Supreme Court rejected 
this doctrine. Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist concluded that 
the practice of binding non-parties to the 
terms of a settlement was inconsistent with 
the scheme of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP), which contemplates 
permissive, as opposed to mandatory, 
intervention. 
Problematic Proffer 
Wilks proffers to employers and minor-
ity employees a different procedural 
device for preventing subsequent suits by 
white employees. But the Wilks "solu-
tion" is fraught with problems for black 
plaintiffs-and ultimately is no solution at 
all. 
Wilks would have discrimination plain-
tiffs use FRCP 19 to bring in as parties-
in other words, to "join"-the white 
employees in the suit that may give rise to 
a decree. The result of joining all white 
employees who may be affected by an af-
firmative-action plan will in almost all 
cases be an extremely complex and un-
wieldy suit at best. 
But unwieldiness and complexity are 
the least of the hurdles . Rule 19 joinder 
suffers from even more severe limitations 
that make it a completely inadequate 
means of producing and protecting con-
sent decrees. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wilks did not 
predict the outcome that Rule 19 would or 
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ees under Rule 19-and they will remain 
wild cards who can destroy whatever 
settlement the parties reach. 
Spoilers at Large 
Another important component of Rule 
19 has the potential to backfire on civil-
rights plaintiffs . The rule requires joinder 
if it appears that the suit will result in a 
judgment prejudicial to the non-
parties' -white employees' -interests. 
Before Wilks , white employees who 
would be barred from subsequently chal-
lenging a consent decree could be joined 
under this test. Wilks , though, cut off the 
possibility that the absent white employees 
will be injured-because it guarantees that 
they will have an opportunity to fIle an 
independent suit. Again, no joinder re-
quired , and the white employees remain 
potential spoilers at large. 
Of course, some courts might require 
joinder of white employees under the 
conflicting-obligations criterion of the 
rule, perhaps even seeing the Wilks opin-
ion as an invitation to do so. Even here , 
the situation presents serious hazards for 
plaintiffs. Besides yielding unwieldy suits 
in some of these cases, in others , applica-
tion of Rule 19 will yield no suit at all. 
This is because the rule gives the court 
discretion to dismiss the suit entirely if ju-
risdiction cannot be obtained over all 
white employees who must be joined un-
der the rule. Rather than protecting against 
challenges to the decree, then , Rule 19 
may simply put the plaintiffs out of court. 
Even assuming that Rule 19 can yield a 
manageable case which includes the white 
employees as parties, their joinder will 
have little effect if the suit is settled by a 
consent decree. Although joined as par-
ties , white employees will not be bound by 
a consent decree between the employer 
and minority employees unless they accept 
the terms of the decree. 
There is nothing the other parties can do 
to force the white employees, once joined, 
to accept the decree; they are free to reject 
it and may succeed in dismissing their part 
of the current suit and bring a subsequent 
discrimination suit based on race-con-
~ scious decisions made pursuant to the de-
o cree. To forestall these subsequent suits, ~z the employer and minority employees 
All the talk of quotas and burdens of 
proof has diverted attention from the 
traps President George Bush 
set-perhaps unwittingly-for 
discrimination victims by rejecting 
must litigate to a final, binding judgment 
after the majority employees have been 
joined. Obviously this thwarts the Title 
VII policy favoring settlement of dis-
crimination cases. 
President aush's rejection of the civil-
rights bill is more than an attack on quotas; 
its effect will be to subvert entirely the use 
of consent decrees in employment dis-
crimination litigation. Consent decrees 
promise a more efficient, more flexible 
resolution to employment discrimination 
suits than full adjudication on the merits 
can provide . Unless consent decrees are 
protected from subsequent attacks in re-
the civil-rights bill. . 
should yield in these cases. He simply 
pointed to the rule as the only device 
available to plaintiffs who wish to bind 
white employees by a consent decree. 
The problem is that Rule 19 frequently 
won't do the job. Some courts will con-
strue the rule not to require joinder of 
white employees in the original suit , and 
will reject plaintiffs' efforts to invoke Rule 
19. Courts have interpreted the rule to re-
quire that non-parties-like the white 
employees in a discrimination suit-be 
joined only when it is likely that the de-
fendant-employer will be otherwise be 
threatened by conflicting obligations. 
And courts disagree on what constitutes 
this threat. Some judges will require Rule 
19 joinder if a laJ~r suit. by. the white. ~m-
verse discrimination suits, the danger of 
ployees could lead to a judgment requiring these attacks will outweigh the decrees' 
promotion or hiring decisions different advantages . The only "protection" 
from those required by the consent decree. available at present-joinder of majority 
But other judges will not require joinder employees under Rule 19 of the Federal 
unless the employer would have to violate Rules-is illUSOry. 
the consent decree to comply with the Much of the public attention to the Civil 
judgment in a subsequent suit. If a decree Rights Act of 1990, and President Bush's 
required that an employer promote a mi- veto, has focused on disputes over the al-
nority employee to a stated position and locations of burdens of proof between 
the subsequent judgment required that the employer~ and plaintiffs in suits charging 
employer promote a majority employee to umntentIOnal but systemic bias in the 
the same position, the employer might be workplace. The defeat of the civil-rights 
able to promote both. This response may bill and the continued force of Martin v. 
be uneconomical , disruptive, and illogi- Wilks, however , promise to bring in-
cal, but it is not impossible. As long as stitutional civil-rights litigation to its 
compliance with both the decree and the knees at a much more fundamental level. 
later judgment is possible , s0'!l~ courts . .Bur~ens of proof? No matter, these cases 
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